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what was not. For instance, the reference to The Gay Science that appears as 
part of note 19 to chapter 5 should be included in the actual text, since the 
reference was present in Nishitani’s original; the rest of the information could 
then be stated in the note. I noticed this type of inconsistency in several places. 
Regarding note 5 to the introduction, there was no “Sendai University” at 
that time; Lowith taught at the TOhoku Imperial University (TOhoku Teikoku 
Daigaku, the present TOhoku Daigaku), which was in Sendai.
Overall, however, it is obvious that much thought and effort went into this 
book: both the translation and the notation are clearly the result of much 
painstaking work. Parkes and Aihara appear to have pioneered a new ap­
proach to translation, in which a trained language teacher explains the intent 
of the work to a specialist who is not a native speaker of the work’s original 
language. The translators have in this case produced an accurate and lucid ren­
dition that will be greatly appreciated by anyone interested in Nishitani’s 
thought.
Yusa Michiko
STUDIES IN THE LITERATURE OF THE GREAT VEHICLE: 
Three MahOyOna Buddhist Texts, Edited by Luis O. Gdmez and 
Jonathan A. Silk. Michigan Studies in Buddhist Literature, I, Ann Ar­
bor, 1989. ISBN 0 89148 0544; 0 89148 0552 (pbk.)
This book contains studies and translations of three Mahayana Buddhist 
works: the Samadhiraja (King of Samadhis Sutra), a second-century Sanskrit 
work, introduced and translated by the Michigan group; the well-known Va- 
jracchedika (Diamond Sutra), edited and translated by Gregory Sc ho pen; and 
$antarak$ita's MadhyamkalamkOra, introduced, edited and translated by 
IchigO Mas ami chi. Regarding this volume, K. R. Norman, in his review in the 
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, No. 2 (1990), points out that “the three 
texts and the treatment afforded them are of a widely differing nature . . . 
[that] the three editions [on which each of the translations is based! vary 
in their format . . . [that] the translations too vary very much in form and 
style . . . [and that] there is a similar variation in the form of the introductions 
to the translation.” Although such variations are indeed apparent I do not 
think this book can be condemned for lack of a unifying principle. Much varie­
ty is to be found within the Mahayana literature itself, hence it is only to be ex­
pected that the works chosen to constitute a volume of studies on Mahayana
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texts would not necessarily be consistent with one another. We should, rather, 
appreciate the fact that “the three contributions illustrate different methodolo­
gies employed in the studies of Buddhist literature and are motivated by 
different aims” (Preface, p. vii).
If any standardization is to be sought for in the textual study of Mahayana 
Buddhism I feel that one of the points which deserves consideration is the 
choice of words used when the translator renders into English a Sanskrit 
technical term that is of critical importance to the Buddhist teachings. If such 
a term is rendered by different English words in each translation, unless the 
readers can somehow determine the original Sanskrit from the English render­
ings they may be unable to grasp that they are encountering in different guises 
the same term whose different nuances require correspondingly different 
treatments.
I see such an example in the renderings of the term khanti in this book. No 
problem arises when khanti means “patience,” as it undoubtedly does in the 
case of the third of the sixparamitas(e.g., Schopen’s translation, p. 124,1. 13). 
We encounter a problem, however, when the same term is rendered by 
Schopen as “composure” or by the team translators of the Samadhiraja as 
“patient acceptance.” Schopen comments (p. 139, n. 20): “As I understand 
the term, it [fcyanr/] more commonly means not ‘to endure’ or ‘to accept’ but 
‘to remain unaffected by’, . . . the phrase niratmakeju dharmeju kjantim 
pratilabheta, which I translate as ‘to achieve composure in the midst of things 
that have no self, is intended above all else as a positive expression of the state 
of mind that is much more commonly expressed in negative terms.” In Part I 
(Studies on the Samadhiraja), on the other hand, anutpattike^u dharmesu 
k^anteh pratilambhah is translated as “the obtainment of the patient accep­
tance of the fact that dharmas are not produced” (p. 69, 1. 18-9), and sar- 
vadharmesu fanyatanulomikT kjantih as “the patience of being receptive to all 
dharmas in accord with emptiness” (p. 76,1. 5-6) or as (allegedly, ‘lit.,’) “pa­
tient acceptance agreeing with emptiness with respect to all dharmas” (p. 87, 
n. 45).
Which of these two apparently divergent understandings should we accept, 
or may we understand the term in yet another way? We here need to trace the 
term khanti back to the earlier Buddhist literature. The term khanti appears in 
the Pali canon where it is used in one of the following three meanings. (1) In 
Sn 879 and 944, khanti means nothing other than “desire.” The word should 
be considered not to be derived from -Jk^am, but from Jkam, hence we find 
kanti as the corresponding Sanskrit form (Wogihara ed., BodhisattvabhQmi, 
p. 49). This khanti, therefore, has nothing to do with the present subject at 
hand. (2) In Sn 189, 266,292, Dh 184, 399, etc., khanti is used undoubtedly in 
the sense of “patience.” This would correspond to the third of the six
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paramitas. (3) In prose suttas we often encounter the phrases di^hi-nijjhana- 
kkhanti (S ii 115, iv 188, M ii 170,218, 234, A i 189, ii 191), dhamma-nijjhdna- 
kkhanti (M i 140), nijjhllnaw khamati (S iii 225, Mi 133, 480), etc. Khanti in 
these phrases surely corresponds to the last of the three kinds of k$anti 
enumerated in some of the Mahayana texts (i.e., dharma-nidhyOna-kjanti in 
Dharmasamgraha §CV1I; dharma-nidhyanajnOna in Levi ed., 
MahayanosQtralamkara, p. 105). It also relates certainly to kjOnti as expound­
ed in the Sarvastivadin Abhidharma, i.e., the third of four nirvedabhOgiya 
ku^alamQla (Abhidharmakofa VI 18c) and the eight Qnantaryamarga steps in 
the course of dartanamQrga (Ak VI 28 ab). here represents no other
than a certain phase of prajnQ. It would have to represent an aspect of intellec­
tuality, something akin to discernment or recognition, which I believe is the 
same as khanti in the set phrase anutpattikadharmak^anti.
Dharma is another term difficult to translate. Schopen comments (p. 137, n. 
13): “In our text the term has at least two basic meanings, and in light of this 1 
have used two renderings. When the term is used to refer primarily to 
‘teaching’ or something taught, as in dharma-paryOya, I have consistently 
translated it by ‘Doctrine’. When it is used in a more ‘philosophical’ sense as 
an element in assertions regarding ‘reality*, I have consistently translated it by 
‘thing’ . . . There is at least one place in our text, the compound dhar- 
macakjus, where I do not know exactly which of the two basic meanings of 
dharma is supposed to be in play. As a consequence, in this case I leave the 
term untranslated. There is also one place in our text where the term appears 
to be used in a third basic sense—sarvadharma buddhadharma itit etc., at 
8ab—and here I have translated it by ‘characteristics.’ **
In the translation of the SamadhirQja, in most of the cases when the word is 
used in the first and the second of the three meanings as differentiated by 
Schopen, dharma remains untranslated as “(the) Dharma” or “dharma(s).” 
In the cases involving the third meaning, however, buddhadharma is rendered 
as “qualities of a buddha” (Ch. 3 G20, Ch. 4 G11), except for a few places (p. 
59 I. 26, Ch. 2 G21) where, dharma remaining untranslated, the whole com­
pound is rendered as “the (eighteen) dharmas unique to buddhas.”
In IchigO’s translation, the term dharma mostly appears in the second mean­
ing for which the translator simply uses the term “dharmas” (G69, G83), 
although in one place (G85) he translates hetuphaladharma as “the law of 
causal relation.” I am not sure whether he sees in the latter case yet a fourth 
meaning of dharma (as “law”), or whether he considers its meaning to be 
derived from the first meaning (i.e., the Buddha’s teachings > the truth > law), 
or whether he thinks it identical with the second meaning, that is, as the whole 




In the preface to this book, the editors draw the attention of Buddhist 
studies majors in the United States to the significance of Buddhist textual 
studies. To my mind, this presents a curious contrast to the situation of Bud­
dhist scholars in Japan, where people are often heard to complain that an 
abundance of text-critical philological studies on Buddhist literature may not 
always be conducive to the genuine understanding of the Buddhist teachings.
Sakurabe Hajime
ONCE UPON A FUTURE TIME: Studies in a Buddhist Prophecy of 
Decline. By Jan Nattier. Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1991. 
ISBN 0-89581-926-0
In East Asian Buddhism the topic of the demise of the Buddha's Dharma 
looms large in terms of sectarian development, historiography, soteriological 
innovation, literary achievement, and more. The importance of this topic has 
naturally resulted in a number of studies. To date, however, virtually all of 
these studies have been colored by that same East Asian perspective—so 
asserts Jan Nattier in an important new work which, by examining the same 
sources from a primarily philological point of view, challenges much of the 
received wisdom on this topic.
Her book is divided fairly evenly into two sections, the first dealing with the 
many strands generally treated under the rubric “decline of the Dharma,” and 
a second that takes a detailed look at the Kau&mbI story, a narrative of the in­
vasion of India by non-Buddhist forces and subsequent dissension within the 
Buddhist sangha that leads to the ultimate demise of the religion. After a brief 
introduction, Nattier outlines the “Frameworks of Buddhist Historical 
Thought” in order to demonstrate that, while containing neither a sense of 
centrally decisive historical events (as in the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic 
traditions) nor a teleological orientation, still, for Buddhists, the “question of 
history . . . has been of central, not peripheral, importance” (p. 9). As is the 
case throughout this book, Nattier’s philological acumen is demonstrated as 
she ranges through Pali, Sanskrit, Tibetan, Uighur, and Mongolian texts to il­
lustrate what she calls the “cosmological” and “Buddhological” frameworks 
of Buddhist history (see also her work on Maitreya, “The Meanings of the 
Maitreya Myth: A Typological Analysis” in Alan Sponberg and Helen Hard-
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